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Introduction
　The Greek word ‘catastrophe’ is composed of two elements: the prefix ‘cata-’ 
indicates a downward movement, whereas ‘-strophe’ belongs to a family of words 
whose fundamental meaning is ‘turning’. Hence ‘catastrophe’ literally means the 
moment in time when something turns the wrong way and begins to collapse. It 
is something like ‘the beginning of the end’.
　In the modern meaning of the word, ‘catastrophe’ is generally conceived of as a 
sudden and unforeseen event which violently disrupts the normal order of things 
and plunges it into chaos. What I would like to argue in this paper is that while 
this pattern of order turning into disorder is also very usual in Ancient thought, 
notably among Greek philosophers and historians, there is a difference in the 
way the catastrophe operates: rather than being a violent and sudden event, the 
catastrophe is often for the Ancients a more progressive and natural change 
from order to disorder, and rather than disrupting the normal state of things, 
it belongs itself to a normal cycle of alternating order and disorder. Whereas 
modern metaphysics would consider a catastrophe as a purely singular event 
and a peak of extreme intensity irreducible to normal being, the Ancients would 
domesticate the catastrophe as a normal phase in a recurring cycle: just as order 
is created out of disorder, naturally the catastrophe destroys order into disorder, 
and then the same cycle goes again.
　In Greek, the word ‘order’ is best translated as kosmos, which of course also 
means ‘world’. So, the destruction of order in the catastrophe is equivalent to 
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the end of the world. But as already mentioned, this end is not a real end, since 
it will turn into the beginning of a new cycle. There is no such thing in Ancient 
thought as an absolute creation of the world at the beginning of ages, then an 
absolute destruction of it at the end; on the contrary, the view that the world is 
eternal is a common tenet of almost all Ancient thinkers, whatever philosophical 
school they belong to. Even among Platonists, the world creation narrative given 
in Plato’s Timaeus was often interpreted allegorically in order to avoid giving 
the cosmos a real beginning. Such a worldview is a bit difficult to imagine for 
us, because we are influenced either by the biblical narrative frame of creation 
by God and final apocalypse or by modern astronomical knowledge about the 
Big Bang or the birth and death of all cosmic formations, but for the Ancients 
it was just normal to think that the world we live in had always been there and 
would always be. For them, the world has not been created and it is not limited 
in time, although it is limited in space. What allows for both the limited space 
and the unlimited time is often the same figure of the circle, in Greek kuklos, 
which becomes ‘cycle’ in English: the world is limited in space because it has a 
spherical shape, and it is unlimited in time because all processes of creation and 
destruction are endlessly alternating within a cyclical time.
Ⅰ. Cosmic cycles
　An early example of a cyclical cosmology is Empedocles’ system. Empedocles 
（5th cent. BC） was one of the so-called ‘Presocratic’ philosophers, and like many 
of them he presented his system not in a theoretical exposition, but through 
poems, which makes it often difficult to interpret. Another obstacle is that 
his philosophical poems are now lost, except for a few fragments and indirect 
quotations in later authors, most notably Aristotle （4th cent. BC） and Simplicius 
（6th cent. CE）. Although there is much controversy on the details of Empedocles’ 
system, its main features are quite clear: the creation and destruction of the 
world occur according to the opposition of two cosmic forces named Love and 
Hate （or Strife）. These are not psychological allegories or mythological gods, 
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but very concrete physical powers: Love is a principle of union, able to dominate 
diversity and mix different things into something unified; on the contrary, 
Hate is a principle of division which separates what is one into its different 
constituents1. These two cosmic principles dominate each other according to a 
recurring cycle: at one time Love prevails on Hate and its triumph is called the 
Sphairos, i.e., a huge motionless sphere in which all things existing are united 
into one homogeneous mixture2; then Hate begins to gain might and divide this 
unity, always separating and dissociating things from one another3. It is obvious 
that in this cycle the world as we know it, i.e., the ‘cosmos’, cannot coincide 
with the opposed poles of Love’s or Hate’s triumph: the universal unity of the 
Sphairos is sterile, because things lose their constitutive differences inside it; and 
symmetrically, Hate’s hegemony is a time when all four elements are completely 
dissociated from one another and are separated into four homogeneous layers, 
preventing anything to be composed from their mixture4. The consequence of 
this is that the world can only exist as an intermediate state between these poles. 
There is some controversy among scholars about the number of cosmogonies 
1 Empedocles, fr. 17, 16-17: ‘At some time all things uniting together according to Love, 
at some time each one of them being carried apart again because of Hate’s enmity’ ［cited 
several times by Simplicius, for example In De caelo, 141, 1-2, and In Phys., 25, 29-30］.
2 Empedocles, fr. 27, 16-17: ‘a perfectly round Sphere stands still rejoicing in solitary 
bliss’ ［Simplicius, In Phys., 1183, 32-1184, 1］.
3 Simplicius, In Phys., 1184, 2-4: ‘But when Hate begins to prevail again, then motion 
happens again in the Sphere: ‘‘for all the limbs of the god quivered one after another’’ 
［= Empedocles, fr. 31］’.
4 Aristotle, Metaph., A 4, 985a 25-27: ‘For when the whole is dispersed into its elements 
by Hate, then all the fire comes together and the same for each of the elements’; for 
the organisation of the cosmos in concentric elemental belts under Hate’s hegemony, 
see M. Rashed’s comments in Aristote, De la génération et corruption, Paris, Les Belles 
Lettres, 2005, p. 166, n. 1.
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in Empedocles: is the world created twice, both under Hate and under Love5, or 
only under Love6? But what is clear is that the world belongs to an intermediary 
phase between their alternate hegemony, because both Love and Hate are at 
the same time creative and destructive: Love creates by mixing and destroys 
by uniting too much, Hate creates by separating different things from unity and 
destroys them by dividing too much7. So, the world does not belong to the sterile 
order of either perfect unity under Love or perfect difference under Hate, but to 
the transitory and imperfect order of balanced unity and difference, when Love 
and Hate somehow balance each other.
　In Empedocles’ system, the world is periodically destroyed, but paradoxically 
there is no violent catastrophe destroying it; on the contrary, when the world 
is changed into the Sphairos, it is the unifying action of Love which destroys 
it. Something closer to our modern conception of catastrophe as destroying the 
world could be find in Stoicism with the ‘conflagration’ theory. In Stoic physics, 
just as for Empedocles, the world is regularly destroyed and recreated to be 
5 This is strongly suggested by Aristotle, De gen. et corr., II, 6, 334a 6-7: ‘［Empedocles］ 
says that the world is similar under Hate now and before under Love’. Classic 
expositions of the double cosmogony interpretation are D. O’Brien, Empedocles’ Cosmic 
Cycle, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, and M.W. Wright, Empedocles: 
The Extant Fragments, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981; for the most 
recent elaboration of this view, see M. Rashed, La jeune fille et la sphère. Études sur 
Empédocle, Paris, Presses de l’université Paris-Sorbonne, 2018.
6 More precisely, in this interpretation, the world as we know it, including animal life, 
exists only under Love as the result of a continuous process involving first a cosmogony 
under Hate, which builds the structure of the cosmos by dissociating the Sphairos into 
grossly homogeneous elemental belts （earth at the centre, then water, air and fire）, 
second a zoogony under Love, which unites parts of the different elements into animate 
compounds. This interpretation is given among others by G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and 
M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1983.
7 Empedocles, fr. 17, 12-14: ‘Double is the birth of mortal things, and double is their death: 
for one is engendered and destroyed by the reunion of all things, whereas another is 
nourished and dissipated by their disjunction’ ［Simplicius, In Phys., 158, 3-5］.
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again destroyed in a recurring cycle that goes on over and over. The starting 
point of this cycle is a state of things in which there is only fire. Of course, 
this primordial fire is not just concrete burning fire as we know it, but it is 
also a creative principle of the world and as such is called God8 （stoicism is a 
materialistic philosophy, so even God is material9）. So fire exists both as having 
a destructive power of burning things, i.e., turning them into itself, and as 
creative fire, called ‘artful fire’ （pur technikon）, which on the contrary shapes 
all things into what they are10. The world is created when the primordial fire 
is progressively attenuated and transformed into the other elements of water, 
air and earth11. Yet this differentiation is only transitory and at some point fire 
starts again to prevail over the other elements, feeding on them to turn them 
into fire until the point where everything has become fire again and a new 
cycle can begin12. This is this phase of destruction of the world which is called 
8 Aëtius, I, 7, 33, 305, 14-306, 2: ‘The Stoics proclaim an intelligent God, which is an artful 
fire methodically proceeding to the creation of the world’ ［SVF, II, 1027］.
9 For a collection of testimonies on God’s corporeity according to the Stoics, see SVF, II, 
1028-1048.
10 Arius Didymus, fr. 33, 2-4: ‘For there are two kinds of fire: one without art and which 
only changes its aliment into itself, and another which is artful, making things grow and 
be preserved’ ［SVF, I, 120］.
11 Diogenes Laërtius, Vit. phil., VII, 142: ‘［According to the Stoics］ the world is created 
when the ［primordial fire］ substance turns into air, then into liquid, then the thick 
part of this liquid condensates until it produces earth, while its finer part turns into 
air; which by becoming still more refined engenders fire; then mixture between them 
makes plants, animals and all other kinds of things’ ［SVF, I, 102 and II, 581］.
12 Aristocles of Messene, De phil., fr. f3, 13-14: ‘［The Stoics say that］ at some times 
determined by fate all the world is turned into fire （ekpurousthai）, and then the 
world is recreated again’ ［SVF, I, 98］; this Stoic theory is closely similar to that of 
the Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus （6th-5th cent. BC）, as is shown for example by 
the following testimony in Diogenes Laërtius, Vit. phil., IX, 8, 5-7: ‘［Heraclitus says 
that］ the world is engendered out of fire and is turned into fire （ekpurousthai） again 
alternately according to some cycles for the whole eternity; and this happens according 
to fate.’
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‘conflagration’ （ekpurosis） in many Ancient testimonies about the Stoics. The 
image of the whole world turning into fire could easily be labelled a ‘catastrophe’, 
but from a Stoic point of view, there is just nothing catastrophic in it, and this 
for two reasons: first, because the conflagration is the time when God coincides 
with itself, which is a much more perfect state than the world as we know it13; 
and second, because the destruction of the world is not its end, since this same 
world will be recreated again and again. The world which is recreated after the 
conflagration is not, strictly speaking, a new world: it is the same as the next and 
the previous ones, in an eternal return of the same14. This fascinating view of 
eternal return seems very counter-intuitive, especially if one takes it as implying 
the return of identical individuals in successive worlds15; but eternal return is 
better understood once you try to think inside the Stoic system, which is based 
on strict determinism: God, which is the material fire at the start of each cycle, is 
also called ‘Fate’16 and everything happens according to it in a chain of necessary 
effects, so in such a system it seems logical that all successive worlds are the 
same, because they are all the same set of necessary consequences deriving from 
13 Plutarch, De comm. not. adv. Stoic., 1067A 2-4: ‘When these people ［= the Stoics］ make 
the conflagration of the world happen, there remains nothing bad in it and the whole of 
it is intelligent and wise’ ［SVF, II, 606］.
14 On eternal return in Stoicism, see the collection of testimonies in A.A. Long and 
D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1987, ch. 52.
15 This issue seems to have been addressed by the Stoics themselves according to 
Simplicius, In Phys., 886, 12-16: ‘When they say that the same me will be born again in 
the recreation of the world, they are right to inquire if I am one numerically now and 
then, because I am the same in being, or if I am made different just by my being set in 
one created world or another’ ［SVF, II, 627］.
16 Diogenes Laërtius, Vit. phil., VII, 135, 9-10: ‘［According to the Stoics］ God, the intellect, 
Fate and Zeus are one and the same thing, which is still called with many other 
denominations’ ［SVF, I, 102］.
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the same starting point17.
Ⅱ. Climatic cycles
　This pattern of cyclical creation and destruction works not only for the world 
as a whole, but also inside the world. Nature is commonly seen by the Ancients 
as a recurrent cycle of generation and corruption in which all things around us 
are continually transforming, first being generated, then decaying and changing 
into something else.
　The most systematic elaboration of this view can be found in Aristotle, 
especially in his treatise On generation and corruption: according to Aristotle, 
the four elements of the world around us, earth, water, air and fire, are able 
to change into one another; for example, fire can become air just by becoming 
colder, and earth can change into water when it changes from being dry into 
being humid18. This process of elemental change is what Aristotle calls ‘generation 
and corruption’ （genesis kai phthora） and it is the matrix of all natural 
phenomena. Even if theoretically any element can change into any of the three 
others, the most obvious instance of such a transformation is the cycle of water 
as Aristotle explains it in his treatise entitled Meteorologica: the heat of sun turns 
into vapour the water which is at the surface of Earth in seas, lakes or rivers; 
17 Aristocles of Messene, De phil., fr. f3, 15-19: ‘［The Stoics say that］ the primordial fire is 
like a kind of semen, containing the developments and causes of all things past, present 
and future, so that their combination and consecution is the inevitable and ineluctable 
fate, knowledge, truth and law of beings’ ［SVF, I, 98］. It is therefore not unlikely 
that eternal return included individuals, at least for some Stoics such as Chrysippus 
（3rd cent. BC）, for whom we have among others the following testimony by Alexander 
of Aphrodisias, In Anal. Pr., 180, 33-36: ‘The Stoics believe that after the conflagration 
everything will be recreated in the world numerically the same, so that even the 
individual with its particular characteristics will be born and exist the same in the next 
world as in the previous one, as Chrysippus says in his books On the World’ ［SVF, II, 
624］.
18 Aristotle, De gen. et corr., II, 4, especially 331 a12-b4.
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this vapour rises into the sky where it can condensate into clouds and give birth 
to various meteorological phenomena such as rain, snow or hail, thus returning 
to the ground for a new cycle19. Aristotle metaphorically describes the cycle of 
water as a vertical river flowing in circle between water and air20. Although the 
function of such a cycle is to ensure a dynamic balance between the elements21, 
especially between water and air, there may be some geographical variations 
in this balance: locally, the cycle may be more or less unbalanced, allowing for 
excessive rain or conversely excessive drought in some regions. This is how 
Aristotle interprets the myth of Deucalion, the only man surviving with his wife 
Pyrrha the deluge sent by Zeus to punish the corrupt mankind of the Bronze 
Age: for Aristotle, this deluge was just a local phenomenon of excessive rain 
in Western Greece, which belongs to a very long climatic cycle of alternating 
dryness and humidity22. Since this climatic cycle is local and does not happen 
everywhere at the same time, different regions will also belong to different 
19 Aristotle, Meteor., I, 9, 346b 24-31: ‘The liquid around the earth evaporates because of 
the sunrays and all the other heat coming from above and it rises up in the sky; but 
when the heat which makes it rise begins to be insufficient, both because it is dispersed 
in the upper space and because it loses heat when going higher up in the air above the 
earth, then the vapour cools down and condenses again because of the place and the 
lack of heat; it changes from air into water and after this change it falls down onto the 
earth again.’
20 Ibid., 347a 2-3: ‘This should be conceived of as some kind of river flowing in circle 
upwards and downwards, common to air and water.’
21 On the issue of balance between the elements, crucial for Aristotelian meteorology and 
cosmology, see my short comments in Aristote, Météorologiques, Paris, Flammarion, 
2008, pp. 18-19.
22 Aristotle, Meteor., I, 14, 352a 29-35: ‘There happens at some fixed intervals of time, 
just as winter in the succession of each year’s seasons, a great winter and excess of 
rain recurring after a long cycle; and this excess of rain does not occur always in the 
same regions, but in the same way as what is called ‘‘Deucalion’s deluge’’; for the latter 
happened mainly in the Greek region, especially in the most ancient part of Greece, i.e., 
that around Dodona and the Achelous river ［in Western Greece］.’
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stages of the cycle23. This is why now some regions are too dry while others are 
too humid; and according to each local climatic cycle dry regions are gradually 
turning into humid ones and humid ones into deserts. Which means that deserts 
used to be fertile lands and that conversely fertile lands will someday become 
deserts, in a horizontal cycle of exchange between fertile and infertile regions. 
If one remembers that this horizontal cycle is a consequence of local variations 
in the vertical cycle of air and water’s transformations, and that these variations 
are themselves recurring according to cyclical periods of time, all of Aristotle’s 
meteorology is seen to be organised, both in time and space, by a circular 
structural pattern.
　In Aristotle’s system, there is no such thing as the creation or destruction of 
the world: the world as we know it has always existed and will always exist, with 
only minor variations within this eternal continuity. But variations that are minor 
for the whole world can be huge for man and human societies. This is particularly 
the case for climatic cycles: men cannot live in a region which is at the start of 
the cycle, because it is too humid and filled with waters; but gradually, sediments 
accumulate, marshes dry up and the land becomes fertile, allowing men to come 
and live there to cultivate the land; then, the continuing process of drying up 
will gradually reduce the fertility of the land, making it more difficult for men 
to cultivate it; and finally, it comes to the point when the land becomes too dry 
and sterile to support human needs and people have to leave for other regions 
which are still in the fertile phase of the cycle24. So, what climatic cycles create 
and destroy is not the whole world as ‘kosmos’, but the human world, i.e., the 
natural environment in which humans can live and build societies. Here we 
23 This is how Aristotle explains the fact that in some regions, which are in the process 
of drying up, the sea recedes and is replaced by land, whereas the contrary happens 
in other regions, which are in a more humid phase of the cycle （Meteor., I, 14, 352a 22-
25）; similarly, rivers and springs tend to disappear in dry regions only to reappear 
elsewhere in regions with increasing humidity （ibid., 351 a36-b4）.
24 Aristotle, Meteor., I, 14, especially 351b 22-352a 17.
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find in Aristotle a very modern idea of how human beings and human societies 
depend on environmental conditions that are fragile and continually changing25. 
We should not take our own existence for granted, because it actually depends 
on natural conditions that will not be preserved forever. Yet, for Aristotle, 
mankind is not really threatened in its own existence and as a biological species 
it is considered eternal. What allows mankind to survive in spite of the periodical 
destruction of its world is that, as already mentioned, this destruction does not 
occur everywhere at the same time: climatic cycles are local, which allows men 
to move in a region at the fertile phase and to move out when it becomes sterile. 
This is another very modern idea: the history of mankind is a story of migrations; 
there is no such thing as autochthons or autochthonous peoples, since any people 
in any land originates in an inward migration, just as in the end it will have no 
way to survive but to leave this land in an outward migration26. So, there is a 
very close connection between the climatic cycles in each region and migration 
cycles between one region and another; and because local climatic changes are a 
natural and very gradual process, migrations also extend over very long periods 
of time which exceed men’s memory27. Of course, Aristotle also mentions that a 
25 Aristotle gives as an example the contrasted fate of Argos and Mycenae in north-eastern 
Peloponnese: ‘At the time of the Trojan war, the region of Argos could feed only few people 
because of its being marshy, whereas that of Mycenae was doing well and as a result was 
held in greater honour; but now it is the contrary because of what we said before: the latter 
has become sterile and completely dry, whereas in the other the land, which had been 
sterile because of stagnant water, has now become usable’ （Meteor., I, 14, 352a 9-14）.
26 Aristotle’s vocabulary is remarkably precise: ‘migrations’ as a generic term translates the 
Greek metanastaseis （ibid., 351b 16）, whereas ‘inward migration’ and ‘outward migration’ 
are respectively katoiskismos （ibid., 351b 22-23） and ‘apoleipsis’ （ibid., 351b 19）.
27 This is what allows for myths of autochthony and some peoples’ belief in really being ‘from 
this land’, whereas in fact they just forgot their foreign origin: ‘it should be understood that 
it also escapes us how each people established itself in the lands that changed from being 
marshy and filled with waters into dry ［i.e., cultivable］ ones; for here again the progress 
takes place gradually over a very long time, so that it cannot be remembered who were 
the first to come, and when, and how was the country then’ （ibid., 351b 22-27）.
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whole people may be destroyed by violent catastrophes, such as wars, epidemics, 
and sudden food shortage28; but most of the time, the destruction happens 
without catastrophe, little by little over a very long time exceeding human 
memory, by the correlative process of environmental degradation and emigration 
to fertile lands29.
Ⅲ. Political cycles
　Such a pattern of recurrent collapse and periodical replacement is to be found 
not only in the external dependency of human communities on their natural 
environment, but also in their internal, i.e., historical and political, working. Just 
as any community in any given place is destined to be destroyed and displaced 
elsewhere because of environmental change, history and politics can also be seen 
as a cyclical collapse and replacement of one empire by another or of one ruling 
class by another.
　This view of political cycles was made especially influential by the Greek 
historian Polybius. Living in the 2nd century BC at the time when Rome 
established an uncontested domination over its rival Carthage and over the city-
states of Greece, Polybius explains in the famous preface of his Histories that 
he intends to account for Rome’s rise to hegemony30 and sets it in parallel with 
a series of empires that previously accessed a prominent position, then lost it: 
the first hegemony was that of the Persians, i.e., the Achaemenid empire on the 
Middle East in the 6th to 4th centuries BC31; in Greece, Athens and Sparta rivalled 
for hegemony until the latter secured it, but only for a dozen years from the 
28 Ibid., 351b 13-14.
29 Ibid., 351b 15-20: ‘［Food shortage because of the land drying up happens very 
progressively］ so that even the migrations of such people escape us, some leaving their 
country while others try to remain until the very moment when the country is unable 
to feed anyone; so it is likely that between the first departure and the last, there is a 
very long time, so that no one can remember ［the whole process］.’
30 Polybius, Hist., I, 1, 5.
31 Ibid., I, 2, 2.
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end of the 5th century BC32; a much wider hegemony was established in the 4th 
century BC by the Macedonians under Alexander the Great, who managed to 
conquer and replace the Achaemenid empire in Asia33; and now a still more 
universal empire has been established by the Romans34. This enumeration of 
hegemonies became a historical topos, especially through another Greek historian 
of Rome, Dionysius of Halicarnassus （1st cent. BC）35. In Polybius, hegemonies are 
not exactly cyclical, since some of them are quite local or contemporary with 
each other, such as the short Greek hegemony of Sparta and the great Asian 
hegemony of Achaemenid Persia; but Polybius’ account suggests nonetheless a 
pattern of rise and decline which was systematised and popularised by Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus: the number of hegemonies rises to five （Assyrians, Medes, 
Persians, Macedonians, Romans36） and local Greek hegemonies are excluded so 
as to leave only universal empires37, which gives a neat succession of powers 
replacing each other in a recurrent pattern of rise, conquest, hegemony, rivalry 
with a new rising power, and eventually replacement by this new power38. In this 
32 Ibid., I, 2, 3; strangely, Polybius does not mention Athens, but only the fact that Sparta 
had to fight for a long time to secure hegemony; the reasons for such an omission are 
investigated by J.-L. Ferrary, ‘L’empire de Rome et les hégémonies des cités grecques 
chez Polybe’, Bulletin de correspondance hellénique, 100, 1976, pp. 283-289.
33 Ibid., I, 2, 4-6.
34 Ibid., I, 2, 7.
35 For the elaboration of Polybius’ list of hegemonies in Dionysius and later authors 
such as Aelius Aristides and Appian （both 2nd cent. CE）, see G. Kaibel, ‘Dionysios von 
Halikarnassos und die Sophistik’, Hermes, 20, 1885, pp. 497-513.
36 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom., I, 2, 2-4 and 3, 3.
37 Ibid., I, 3, 1-2.
38 This pattern is especially clear in Dionysius’ account of Macedonia’s hegemony: ‘The 
Macedonian power broke down the might of the Persians and in size it exceeded all 
previous hegemonies, but in time even theirs did not flourish long; on the contrary, 
after Alexander’s death it began to change for the worse, for it was torn apart between 
many generals right from the time of the Diadochi ［Alexander’s successors］; and after 
them it still had might to go on until the second and the third generations, but it had 
made itself too weak and eventually was destroyed by the Romans’ （ibid., I, 2, 3）.
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view of history, each empire is a political order which attempts to extend itself 
from a local scale to the whole world, but will eventually collapse to be replaced 
by another world order.
　In this cycle of hegemonies, the end of one empire often takes the form of 
military catastrophe, i.e., decisive battle and defeat against the next hegemonic 
power39. Yet Ancient historians also looked for deeper reasons, especially to 
explain the Romans’ rise to hegemony: according to Polybius, Rome’s irresistible 
empire was due to its political institutions40 and its peculiar ‘mixed’ constitution41. 
Polybius describes with great detail how all other constitutions naturally tend 
to collapse after a while in a cyclical manner: monarchy degenerates into 
39 Examples could be Alexander’s victories against Achaemenid Persia at the battles 
of the Granicus and Issus （respectively 334 and 333 BC）, and at the end of the 
Macedonian cycle the victory of the Romans against Perseus of Macedon at the battle 
of Pydna in 168 BC.
40 Polybius, Hist., III, 2, 6, 2-10: ‘We will give an account of the Roman political 
constitution, and right after that we will show that the peculiar character of this 
constitution greatly benefited the Romans not only in order to acquire domination over 
Italians and Sicilian Greeks, but also to gain power over Iberians and Celts, and at 
last to conceive of a more universal ambition after submitting Carthage by war’ （this 
programmatic passage in book III announces book VI, which deals with Rome’s political 
institutions and their history）.
41 For Polybius, the model for a mixed constitution was set by Lycurgus’ legislation of 
Sparta, but the Romans had reached the same result through the many troubles of 
their early history （ibid., VI, 10）. The mixed constitution was a blend of monarchy, 
aristocracy and democracy, and the balance of powers on which it relies was supposed 
to avoid the pitfalls of each type of constitution. A detailed analysis of this idea in 
Polybius has been made by K. von Fritz, The Theory of the mixed constitution in 
Antiquity. A critical analysis of Polybius’ political ideas, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1954; a more general history of ‘mixed constitution’ theories in Antiquity from 
Plato to Plutarch and Aelius Aristides is given by G.J.D. Aalders, Die Theorie der 
gemischten Verfassung im Altertum, Amsterdam, Verlag Adolf M. Hakkert, 1968.
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tyranny42, which transforms into aristocracy43, then aristocracy degenerates into 
oligarchy44, which in turn ends up into democracy45, and democracy eventually 
degenerates into ochlocracy, i.e., the violent power of the mob46. This famous 
theory of a cycle of constitutions, called in Greek anakuklosis, is inspired by 
book VIII of Plato’s Republic, but the sequence of political regimes is different: 
Plato starts with aristocracy, i.e., the ideal city-state ruled by philosophers, then 
aristocracy deteriorates into timocracy47, timocracy into oligarchy48, oligarchy into 
democracy49 and finally democracy into tyranny50. It is not clear in Plato if, and 
how, the worst regime, tyranny, could bring back to the starting point of the 
cycle, i.e., the ideal city of philosophers51; yet there is clearly a linear sequence 
of constitutions in a logical order52 and it is this idea that Polybius takes up and 
42 Polybius, Hist., VI, 7, 4-8.
43 Ibid., 7, 8-8, 3.
44 Ibid., 8, 4-5.
45 Ibid., 8, 6-9, 3.
46 Ibid., 9, 4-7.
47 Plato, Rep., VIII, 545c 8-547c 5.
48 Ibid., 550d 3-551b 7.
49 Ibid., 555b 3-557a 8.
50 Ibid., 562a 4-569c 9.
51 This omission was criticised by Plato’s pupil Aristotle in his Politics, V, 12, 1316a 25-
34: ‘［Socrates in Plato’s Republic］ does not say if there will be a change of tyranny 
or not, by what cause or into what kind of constitution; the reason for this is that it 
would not have been easy to say it, because this change is not strictly determined: 
according to him, it should be into the first and best constitution, so that there would 
be a continuous cycle, whereas in fact tyranny also changes into another tyranny ［...］, 
or into oligarchy ［...］, or into democracy ［...］, or into aristocracy ［...］’ （omitting the 
historical examples given by Aristotle for each kind of change）.
52 Aristotle also criticises this linearity both because intermediate steps in the sequence 
can be skipped （ibid., 1316a 18-20: ‘all constitutions often change to the opposite rather 
than the one that is closest’） and because the order can be reversed （ibid., 1316a 23-
24: ‘yet constitutions also change the other way round, for example a democracy into an 
oligarchy, and this more often than into a monarchy’）.
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makes more systematic. In Polybius, the cycle is divided in three pairs, i.e., two 
regimes ruled by only one man, two regimes ruled by an elite of a few persons, 
and two regimes ruled by the whole people; and each pair starts with a good 
regime at first （monarchy, aristocracy, democracy）, which is perverted in a bad 
constitution （tyranny, oligarchy, ochlocracy）. So, the whole cycle has a very 
simple structure: good and bad rule of one, good and bad rule of a few, good and 
bad rule of all. It is a real cycle because the last regime, ochlocracy, leads back 
to the complete anarchy from which the first regime, monarchy, originated. At 
the start, according to Polybius, monarchy appears when human beings begin 
to organise socially again after having been destroyed by such catastrophes as 
floods, epidemics or bad crops: the few human beings surviving the catastrophe 
are reduced to live like animals, but progressively they multiply and start living 
together, which naturally leads to choosing a leader and forming monarchies53. 
At the end of the cycle, the violence of the mob in ochlocracy is such that it 
completely destroys the social body and returns it to the state of ‘savage beasts’54, 
which brings the whole anakuklosis to its starting point, as if the political 
catastrophe resulting from ochlocracy was equivalent to the natural catastrophe 
from which the cycle of constitutions originated at the start.
Conclusion
　In many Ancient worldviews, both time and space are organised by the figure 
of the circle: men live on a spherical earth at the centre of the universe, which 
is itself a sphere; but this finite spherical world has always existed and will 
53 Polybius, Hist., VI, 5, 5-9. At this stage, socialisation and leadership are not a political 
but a natural process very similar to what happens in animals through gregarious 
instinct: the few people surviving the catastrophe ‘congregate to those of the same 
species’ （ibid., 5, 7, 3） and ‘they come together in the same way as animals, following 
those among them who have more courage and physical strength’ （ibid., 5, 9, 2-3）.
54 Ibid., VI, 9, 9, 2-4: ‘［political violence in ochlocracy increases］ until the point when the 
people is brought back to the state of savage beasts and finds again a ruler and a monarch’.
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always exist, so that it has to subsist for an infinite time; this means that any 
catastrophe that could destroy the world has to be compensated by a reverse 
process of recreation, in an alternating cycle of destruction and creation. In such 
a cyclical time, the catastrophe is at the junction between one cycle and the next, 
so that its function is to bring back an ending cycle to the beginning of the next 
one. Catastrophe, with its etymological meaning of ‘turning downwards’, is the 
recurrent moment of return to the starting point, according to a kind of temporal 
gravity which periodically makes the world fall back to its original state. This 
view, which we found in Greek historians as well as philosophers and in such 
different areas as cosmology, meteorology, anthropology, history and politics, 
is quite different from what we moderns conceive of as catastrophe. First, 
catastrophe is not necessarily sudden and violent: on the contrary, it can be a 
very slow process of transformation, as when the world turns back to the perfect 
unity of the Sphairos or when a land becomes gradually infertile and compels 
the people living in it to emigrate little by little to more fertile countries. Second, 
the catastrophe is not an unexpected disruption of order into disorder: being 
part of a cycle, the catastrophe can be predicted by anyone having knowledge 
of the whole cycle, and it belongs to an ordered pattern of recurring events, so 
that, for example, even the chaotic state of anarchy can be integrated to the 
ordered anakuklosis of political regimes. Third, the catastrophe is not singular 
or unprecedented: it recurs periodically and it contains in itself the possibility 
of the same world repeating itself over and over for an infinite time. For the 
modern conception of the catastrophe as a singular, unpredictable and violent 
destruction precluding any return to the former state of things, maybe we 
should coin another word and call it ‘diastrophe’, where the prefix ‘dia-’ expresses 
a movement of transgression and deviation: in the catastrophe, collapse brings 
things back on their feet and we stay inside the circle of time, whereas in the 
sideways move of the ‘diastrophe’, of which nuclear accidents and climatic 
change may be the archetypes, we are led outside the circle, moving forward to 
unprecedented and unpredictable consequences with no hope of turning back.
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